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1635 
Smack Apparel, College Color 
Schemes and the Muddying of 
Trademark Law 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, the collegiate licensing industry scored a major 
victory in its ongoing quest to secure revenue streams and to 
protect the brand images of universities.1 That victory, 
however, created major potential problems for trademark law. 
In Board of Supervisors for Louisiana State University 
Agricultural and Mechanical College v. Smack Apparel Co. 
(“Smack Apparel”), the Fifth Circuit held that a university’s 
color scheme, combined with “other identifying indicia” of the 
university, was entitled to trademark protection under section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act, thus allowing universities to block 
certain unlicensed uses of their color schemes on products.2  
The defendant, Smack Apparel—whose website boasts 
that its products are “licensed only by the First Amendment”3—
sold t-shirts that used the color schemes of Louisiana State 
University and other universities, including the other three 
plaintiff universities—Ohio State University, University of 
  
 1 E.g., E-mail Interview with Bruce Siegal, Senior Vice President and 
General Counsel, IMG College/Collegiate Licensing Company (Nov. 2, 2009) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Siegal Interview] (calling the outcome a “significant victories 
[sic] for the schools that took action to protect their marks and the marketplace 
position of legitimate retailers and licensees”). The Collegiate Licensing Company was 
a named plaintiff in Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University v. Smack 
Apparel, 550 F.3d 465, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2008), and it serves as the licensing agent for 
the plaintiff universities. 
 2 550 F.3d at 471, cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 2759 (2009). The Lanham Act 
contains the federal statutes pertaining to trademark law. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n 
(2006). Two other United States District Court cases—one prior to and one after Smack 
Apparel—have addressed the issue of university color schemes. See Texas Tech Univ. v. 
Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (color scheme found to be valid 
trademark); Univ. of Kansas v. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. 2008) (The court 
declined to overturn a jury finding that a university color scheme lacked sufficient 
secondary meaning to be protectable as a trademark.). The Smack Apparel decision 
represents the only example of a United States Circuit Court of Appeals taking up the 
issue, and the United States Supreme Court denied Smack Apparel’s certiorari petition. 
 3 SMACK APPAREL, http://www.smackapparel.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2011). 
1636 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4 
Southern California, and the University of Oklahoma.4 The 
shirts did not mention the universities by name or use their 
logos or other registered trademarks, but rather combined their 
respective color schemes with indirect references to the 
universities by using geography, bowl championships, and/or 
allusions to rival teams.5 For example, one shirt, marketed to 
University of Oklahoma (“OU”) fans, used OU’s crimson and 
crème colors and read “Bourbon Street or Bust” (with the “ou” 
in “Bourbon” in a different typestyle so that it stood out) on the 
front, and “Sweet as Sugar!” on the back; the combination 
referred to the 2004 Sugar Bowl contest to be played between 
OU and Louisiana State University (“LSU”).6 Another, 
marketed to Ohio State (“OSU”) fans, used OSU’s scarlet and 
grey scheme and read, “Got Seven?” on the front, and, “We do! 
7 Time National Champs,” on the back, along with a graphic of 
the state of Ohio and a marker denoting the location of 
Columbus, Ohio.7 At the time, Ohio State had claimed seven 
national college football championships, and the shirt was an 
easily recognizable tribute to that achievement.8 
Although the plaintiff universities did not possess 
registered trademarks in their color schemes, the words and 
phrases used on the offending shirts, or in any particular 
combinations thereof,9 they successfully sued10 Smack Apparel 
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,11 which protects 
unregistered trademarks that are used in commerce,12 and the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s findings. The Lanham 
Act defines a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device, 
or any combination thereof—(1) used by a person . . . to identify 
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, 
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the 
source of the goods. . . .”13 
  
 4 Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 472. Also named as a plaintiff was the Collegiate 
Licensing Company, the licensing agent for all four universities. Wayne Curtis, the 
principal of Smack Apparel, was the only other named defendant. Id. at 471-72. 
 5 Id. at 472-73. 
 6 Id. at 472. 
 7 Id. at 473. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 475. 
 10 Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. v. Smack Apparel Co., 438 F. Supp. 
2d 653 (E.D. La. 2006). 
 11 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2006). 
 12 See, e.g., GRAEME DINWOODIE & MARK JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, LAW AND POLICY 14 (2d ed. 2007). 
 13 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
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The universities’ lawsuit did not claim trademarks in 
their color schemes alone, but rather color schemes in 
combination with other unspecified “identifying indicia,” and 
the court granted that protection.14 The court determined that 
the university color schemes, combined with the identifying 
indicia, could be protected as trademarks because they 
possessed “secondary meaning” for consumers and served as 
“source identifiers” of university-licensed goods.15 The court 
then went through the second prong of the trademark 
infringement test—the “likelihood of confusion” analysis—and 
determined that Smack Apparel’s shirts infringed the plaintiff 
universities’ marks because they were likely to create the 
impression that the universities had somehow licensed, 
sponsored, or otherwise approved the shirts.16  
The Smack Apparel decision thus gave universities 
increasing opportunity to pursue not only unlicensed 
manufacturers who reproduced the universities’ logos and 
other registered trademarks, but also manufacturers who 
merely combined the universities’ color schemes with indirect 
references. Likewise, it also expanded the number of items for 
which manufacturers would have to seek licenses from the 
universities, presumably providing the universities with an 
expanded source of licensing revenue. 
Courts have grown increasingly sympathetic to and 
protective of such interests in the context of trademark law.17 To 
a certain extent, this sympathy is understandable. Universities 
invest enormous amounts of money, time, and effort in building 
up their educational and sports brands. They hope to generate 
revenues that will fund athletic and academic programs and to 
improve their image with applicants and the general public.  
But these motivations are not sufficient justifications in 
themselves for the Fifth Circuit’s holding, which not only 
distorts the letter of trademark law, but also the spirit of it. 
Courts should ask not only why universities want trademark 
protection for their color schemes (which is fairly 
understandable), but also whether it’s a proper use of 
trademark law to afford such protections. Courts must stay 
true to the purposes of trademark law, which are primarily to 
  
 14 Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 476. 
 15 Id. at 476-78. 
 16 See id. at 478-85. 
 17 See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile 
Theory or Fait Accompli, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 466-78 (2005). 
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protect producers and consumers against harmful consumer 
confusion as to the source of products.18 Further, the role of the 
courts in trademark disputes should not be merely to secure 
revenue sources and protect control of brands, but also to 
balance such desires against concerns such as maintaining a 
workable trademark law scheme and avoiding undue barriers 
to market entry and free commerce. 
This note will argue that Smack Apparel fails to balance 
these concerns. First, the decision misreads and misapplies the 
Lanham Act by creating an unclear and open-ended “color plus 
other identifying indicia” framework that does not satisfy the 
definition of a “mark.” Second, it mistakes consumer 
association of color schemes with the universities for consumer 
confusion about the source of the products bearing the colors. 
Finally, it ignores the longstanding fan and community interest 
in showing support for colleges and their teams, and the 
longstanding traditional uses of college color schemes by fans 
and local businesses in ways that have not been pursued as 
trademark violations. The result trends toward a regime where 
anyone wishing to make reference to a university with a 
commercial product must seek permission of the university 
(which the university can deny), and must pay a royalty even if 
approved. In doing so, Smack Apparel continues and advances 
a troubling expansion of trademark law beyond its purpose of 
avoiding “source confusion” and toward a creation of a right to 
total control over one’s brand and exclusive right to profit.19 
Part I of this note will explain the general theory behind 
and legal limits of trademark protection and how it relates to 
companies that seek protection of their trademark colors. Part 
I will also examine how the court in Smack Apparel applied 
and arguably expanded trademark law to protect color schemes 
in a different way than the Supreme Court envisioned in 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, Inc.20 Part II will argue that 
the color-plus-other-identifying-indicia formula presented in 
Smack Apparel is unworkable as a trademark scheme because 
it is too open-ended and unclear—both in terms of what actual 
marks it protects and for what products the mark is valid. Part 
III will argue that university color schemes, even combined 
  
 18 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 2:1 (4th ed. 2010) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS]. 
 19 See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 17. 
 20 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) (colors alone protectable as trademarks provided 
they acquired “secondary meaning” in minds of consumers). 
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with other indicia, do not function as “source identifiers” under 
trademark law, but merely as references to the universities. It 
will also argue that college sports fans understand school color 
schemes as references to and displays of support for university 
sports teams, rather than as “source identifiers” of university 
products. Part IV will argue that universities’ interest in 
profiting from their brands must be balanced against the 
public’s interest in showing support for the universities and 
their teams, and that universities should not have monopolistic 
control over all commercial expressions of fan support. Part V 
will examine the ways in which Smack Apparel has already 
impacted university trademark enforcement and its potential 
to create further problems. And finally, the conclusion of the 
note will look at possible alternatives to the trademark scheme 
laid out by Smack Apparel. 
I. THE PLACE OF SMACK APPAREL IN EXISTING TRADEMARK 
DOCTRINE 
A. The Functions of Trademark Law 
Trademark law is generally understood as having the 
dual function of consumer protection and producer protection. 
As a Senate report on the Trademark Act of 1946 (the “Lanham 
Act”) explained,  
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to 
protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a 
product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it 
will get the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, 
where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money 
in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his 
investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is 
the well-established rule of law protecting both the public and the 
trade-mark owner.21 
In addition, trademarks are seen as having an economic 
efficiency function. First, they are believed to encourage the 
production of quality products by giving producers an incentive 
to create products of good and consistent quality so that 
consumers will remember and seek out the products under 
  
 21 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946)). 
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their trademarks.22 Second, and relatedly, trademarks are 
believed to reduce consumers’ “search costs”—they eliminate 
the time, effort, and expense it would take to compare the 
relative quality of a variety of products if there were no readily 
available, reliable signifiers of brand and maker.23 
Trademark law has long encompassed tension between 
the benefits of protecting producer goodwill and the danger of 
creating a traditional property “right in gross”24 in a trademark. 
As Judge Augustus Noble Hand put it: 
A trade-mark is not property in the ordinary sense but only a word 
or symbol indicating the origin of a commercial product. The owner 
of the mark acquires the right to prevent the goods to which the 
mark is applied from being confused with those of others and to 
prevent his own trade from being diverted to competitors through 
their use of misleading marks. There are no rights in a trade-mark 
beyond these . . . . The question in each case is not whether the mark 
has been registered, or even whether it has at one time been used by 
the person seeking protection, but whether, as applied to a 
particular line of goods, it signifies the source.25 
Trademarks are thus somewhat different from even other 
intellectual property rights in this way, in that what is 
protected is not a work or an invention but a particular usage.26 
  
 22 See, e.g., MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 18, § 2.4 (“If consumers 
can learn about the quality levels associated with each brand, this gives each 
manufacturer an incentive to improve the quality of his product as much as consumers 
are willing to pay for it. By contrast, if there were no trademarks . . . a manufacturer 
would gain little or nothing from improving his product’s quality. Consumers would be 
unable to recognize high-or low-quality brands, so sales would tend to go to manufacturers 
who reduced their price by cutting corners on quality. The result would be a race to produce 
inferior products, rather than competition to produce better ones.”) (quoting The Craswell 
Report 7 (FTC Policy Planning Issues Paper: Trademarks, Consumer Information and 
Barriers to Competition, FTC Office of Policy Planning 1979)). 
 23 See id. § 2.5 (quoting The Craswell Report 4-5 (FTC Policy Planning Issues 
Paper: Trademarks, Consumer Information and Barriers to Competition, FTC Office of 
Policy Planning 1979)) (“The effect of this brand-distinguishing function is to allow 
consumers to collect information . . . about particular brands of products. Without 
trademarks, a consumer could learn about the average quality of canned soup in 
general [for example], or could try to taste each individual can before buying it, but 
nothing would be available between these two extremes. Trademarks provide an 
intermediate solution by dividing the class of all cans of soup into various brands, so 
that consumers can learn about the qualities associated with each brand.”). 
 24 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (“The 
asserted doctrine is based upon the fundamental error of supposing that a trade-mark 
right is a right in gross or at large, like a statutory copyright or a patent for an 
invention, to either of which, in truth, it has little or no analogy. There is no such thing 
as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or 
trade in connection with which the mark is employed.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 25 Indus. Rayon Corp. v. Dutchess Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1937). 
 26 Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 97. 
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From the perspective of universities, stronger and more 
expansive trademark protection means more ability to generate 
revenue and greater control over one’s brand. In 2008, 
collegiate-licensed retail product sales totaled $4.3 billion,27 
representing an increase of 7.5% over the prior year even as 
overall retail merchandise sales decreased by 14%.28 In the 
period from 2004 to 2008, sales of collegiate-licensed apparel—
generally the largest sales category of licensed sports 
apparel29—grew 60%,30 and sales of other collegiate-licensed 
products grew 67% during the same period.31  
Louisiana State University, one of the four plaintiff 
universities in Smack Apparel and one of the five highest-
grossing schools in licensing revenues,32 receives a 10 percent 
royalty rate on the wholesale price of licensed merchandise.33 
There can be no doubt that part of the motivation for 
universities to seek to expand the scope of their trademarks is 
to continue to grow their licensing revenue. 
Another motivation for universities in expanding their 
trademarks lies not only in profiting from licensed products but 
also in maintaining their brand images. Applicants, in order to 
become licensees via the Collegiate Licensing Company—which 
represents 200 universities, colleges, and collegiate athletic 
organizations34—must also receive approval for products from 
individual licensor institutions, which may reject products seen 
as offensive, obscene, or in some way inappropriate to the 
institution’s image.35 Louisiana State University, for example, 
has rejected poker chips—to avoid association with gambling—
  
 27 The Collegiate Licensing Company, Collegiate Licensing Industry Overview 
at 41 (Aug. 2009) [hereinafter Collegiate Licensing Industry Overview]. The Collegiate 
Licensing Company, one of the plaintiffs in Smack Apparel, is the largest collegiate 
licensing company in the United States. Media FAQs, COLLEGIATE LICENSING COMPANY, 
http://www.clc.com/clcweb/publishing.nsf/Content/faq-media.html?open&faqtype=media 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2011). As of February, 2011 it represented “nearly 200 colleges, 
universities, bowl games, athletic conferences, the Heisman Trophy and the [National 
Collegiate Athletics Association].” Id. 
 28 Collegiate Licensing Industry Overview, supra note 27, at 38.  
 29 Id. at 42. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Ryan Buxton, University Trademark Licensing Brings Big Bucks, DAILY 
REVEILLE (La.) (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.lsureveille.com/news/university-trademark-
licensing-brings-big-bucks-1.1996649. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Media FAQs, supra note 27. 
 35 See, e.g., Buxton, supra note 32 (LSU rejects products such as a flush toilet 
that played the LSU fight song and a hat that was composed in part of a jockstrap). 
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as well as a hat made from a jockstrap, and a box of fake feces 
labeled “Tiger Peaux.”36 Thus, by gaining greater control over 
university-related products, a school can maintain and 
strengthen its goodwill by preventing association with 
unsavory or undesirable products,37 which in turn also helps 
protect revenue streams.38 
Given their interests, the universities’ position is 
understandable. Trademark law has long recognized that 
trademarks serve the purpose of protecting investment in 
goodwill.39 Universities invest in sports in particular with the 
hope of improving their brands and generating revenue. 
Further, on an intuitive level, one can see something slightly 
unsavory in the business practices of companies like Smack 
Apparel, who appear to be skirting as close as they can to the 
plaintiffs’ trademarks without violating them. In any case, it’s 
clear that Smack Apparel was intentionally free riding on the 
plaintiff universities’ sports successes, as both the trial and 
appellate courts noted.40  
But the motive of protecting university goodwill must be 
balanced against other market concerns. An overly expansive 
and unclear trademark regime risks creating barriers to 
commerce by giving trademark holders broader ability to 
  
 36 Id. 
 37 Apparently, however, some universities have no problem associating their 
marks with death:  
The Alabama coffin fairly stands out: it’s a big red box with the school logo on 
the top and a white velvet “A” sewn into the lid. . . . The oddest detail is that 
the coffin is affixed with a small round sticker that reads “Officially Licensed 
Collegiate Product,” the same one you find affixed to sweatshirts and baseball 
caps.  
WARREN ST. JOHN, RAMMER JAMMER YELLOW HAMMER 86 (2004). 
 38 See, e.g., Siegal Interview, supra note 1 (“We view the case as being 
primarily about brand protection, which is based on the ability to protect and control 
the brand in a way that keeps infringing products (including unsavory products) at 
bay. Strong brand protection helps pave the way for a successful licensing program 
that maximizes revenues for the brand owner.”). 
 39 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 18, § 2:30 (“The creation of value 
in a trademark requires ‘the expenditure of great effort, skill and ability’ and a competitor 
should not be permitted to take a ‘free ride’ on the trademark owner’s good will and 
reputation.”) (quoting Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1968)); see also 
Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir. 1976) (“[T]hose 
who invest time, money and energy in the development of goodwill and a favorable 
reputation [should] be allowed to reap the advantages of their investment.”). 
 40 Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack 
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 489 (5th Cir. 2008) (“As noted by the district court, Smack 
copied the mark with an intent to rely upon the drawing power in enticing fans of the 
particular universities to purchase their shirts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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threaten and litigate against alleged infringers, and in turn 
discourages more businesses from risking infringement by 
delving into the murky gray area that results.  
B. The Requirements for a Valid and Protectable Mark 
Because trademarks are primarily source-identifiers, 
the Lanham Act requires that a mark be sufficiently 
“distinctive” to warrant protection.41 The distinctiveness of a 
mark is measured along a spectrum consisting of five 
categories of marks: (1) “generic,” (2) “descriptive,” (3) 
“suggestive,” (4) “arbitrary,” or (5) “fanciful.”42 At the low end of 
the spectrum, generic terms (for example “Bread” as an 
identifier of bread) are never protectable as trademarks.43 At 
the upper end of the spectrum, suggestive, arbitrary, and 
fanciful terms are afforded a presumption of being “inherently 
distinctive.”44 Descriptive terms, however, are never inherently 
distinctive and can be found distinctive, and thus, protectable, 
only if the user can prove “secondary meaning”—namely, that 
the mark has grown to be primarily associated in consumers’ 
minds with a particular source rather than the mark’s merely 
descriptive aspect.45 
Colors, of course, cannot precisely correspond to “generic,” 
“descriptive,” “suggestive,” or “arbitrary” word marks, because 
colors function quite differently from words. But as explained 
below, courts have developed a scheme in which a purely color-
based mark is treated somewhat like a descriptive mark: it can 
never be “inherently distinctive,” but can receive protection if the 
mark holder demonstrates that the color or color scheme has 
“secondary meaning” in the minds of consumers46—namely, that it 
functions primarily as a source-identifier. 
C. Trademark Protection of Colors 
Before Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.,47 the 
circuit courts were divided on whether color alone could receive 
  
 41 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 18, § 11:2. 
 42 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (adopting the test 
from Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
 43 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 18, § 11:2. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
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trademark protection under the Lanham Act.48 In its refusal, 
pre-Qualitex, to allow the trademarking of color alone, the 
Seventh Circuit expressed some of the more common 
reservations about allowing such protection—for example, that 
“infringement actions could soon degenerate into questions of 
shade confusion.”49 Further, the court found that “if each of the 
competitors presently in the tabletop sweetener market were 
permitted to appropriate a particular color for its product, new 
entrants would be deterred from entering the market.”50 In 
other words, there are a limited number of perceptibly different 
colors in the spectrum and every time a producer is allowed to 
monopolize a color or shade (and, by extension, confusingly 
similar shades), there are fewer colors for new market entrants 
to choose from. This concern for competition is, of course, not 
unique to color marks and often plays a key role in the 
formulation of trademark law.51  
Qualitex resolved the circuit split. The Supreme Court 
held that Qualitex, the plaintiff, was entitled to trademark 
protection for the green-gold color of its dry-cleaning pads, thus 
ruling that there were certain circumstances where color alone 
could receive protection. But the Court’s holding was limited in 
two ways. First, it declared that color alone can never be 
“inherently distinctive”52 and must thus achieve “secondary 
meaning”53 to receive protection. As Justice Breyer wrote,  
[O]ver time, customers may come to treat a particular color on a 
product or its packaging (say, a color that in context seems unusual, 
such as pink on a firm’s insulating material or red on the head of a 
large industrial bolt) as signifying a brand. And, if so, that color 
would have come to identify and distinguish the goods—i.e., “to 
indicate” their “source”—much in the way that descriptive words on 
a product (say, “Trim” on nail clippers or “Car-Freshner” on 
deodorizer) can come to indicate a product’s origin. In this 
  
 48 See id. at 160-61 (comparing NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 
1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 1990) (absolute prohibition against protection of color alone), with 
In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (allowing 
registration of color pink for fiberglass insulation), and Master Distribs., Inc. v. Pako 
Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cir. 1993) (declining to establish per se prohibition 
against protecting color alone as a trademark)). 
 49 NutraSweet, 917 F.2d at 1027, overruled by Qualitex, 514 U.S. 159. 
 50 Id. at 1028. 
 51 See, e.g., Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (“There are but a limited number of words and images suitable for use in 
describing a product, and sellers own neither the English language nor common 
depictions of goods.”). 
 52 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163. 
 53 Id. (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982)). 
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circumstance, trademark law says that the word (e.g., “Trim”), 
although not inherently distinctive, has developed “secondary 
meaning.”54 
In other words, Qualitex allowed trademark protection for color 
alone only where the color serves “as a symbol that 
distinguishes a firm’s goods and identifies their source, without 
serving any other significant function.”55 The Court concluded 
that the dry-cleaning pads at issue met that standard: “The 
green-gold color acts as a symbol. Having developed secondary 
meaning (for customers identified the green-gold color as 
Qualitex’s), it identifies the press pads’ source. And, the green-
gold color serves no other function.”56 
Of course, this appeared to present a narrow range of 
circumstances where a color could receive trademark 
protection, as the color had to serve no function other than 
identifying the source of the product. Such a conclusion is easy 
to reach in the case of products like dry-cleaning pads, or 
fiberglass insulation,57 where the color of the product is unlikely 
to serve any function—even an aesthetic one58—other than 
distinguishing the product from those of competitors. But in 
many of its uses, color is functional and thus not protectable—
because it somehow reduces cost, increases visibility, or 
otherwise helps the product serve its purpose.59  
D. College Color Schemes Alone Would Not Be Protectable 
The plaintiff universities in Smack Apparel almost 
certainly could not have obtained protection for their two-tone 
  
 54 Id. at 163 (internal citations omitted). 
 55 Id. at 166. 
 56 Id. 
 57 In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 58 The circuits remain divided over the so-called “aesthetic functionality” 
doctrine, in which aesthetics alone can be a sufficient “function” for the color of a 
product and thus bar trademark protection for the color. For a more thorough 
examination of the doctrine and its difficulties, see MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra 
note 18, § 7.80. The Fifth Circuit rejects the doctrine of aesthetic functionality. See, e.g., 
Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 
F.3d 465, 487-88 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 59 See Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982) (declining to 
overturn a district court finding that color in pills was functional because patients 
associated certain colors with a “therapeutic effect” and also used colors to distinguish 
pills); Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution, LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1203-04 
(11th Cir. 2004) (color found to be functional, and thus not entitled to trademark 
protection, because it indicated the flavor of the ice cream product); Shakespeare Co. v. 
Silstar Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (clear tip of fishing rod was 
functional because it showed that the tip was made of fiberglass). 
1646 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4 
color schemes alone for products like apparel, and they made 
clear that they were not seeking as much.60 First, a two-tone 
color scheme, on its own, would probably fail to sufficiently 
serve as a source identifier (imagine a crimson and crème 
striped polo shirt with no other marks, for example—it’s 
unlikely a consumer would assume that the shirt had anything 
to do with a particular university, let alone that it had been 
licensed or approved by a university). Further, the plaintiff 
universities would potentially run into clashes with other 
college and professional sports franchises. For example, 
Louisiana State University’s purple and gold scheme is 
exceedingly similar to the color schemes used by the Los 
Angeles Lakers and the Minnesota Vikings,61 and the crimson 
and crème color scheme is used by numerous other universities 
and colleges. One district court has even argued that university 
color schemes themselves may in fact be functional: “Football 
uniform colors clearly perform a function. They help avoid 
confusion as to team members for the benefit of officials, 
opposing team members and spectators.”62 
Thus Smack Apparel is not really a descendent of 
Qualitex at all; if anything it has more in common with cases—
including those predating Qualitex—where color was merely an 
element of a trademark that also included words and/or 
images. But Smack Apparel represented a departure from 
those cases as well. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF “COLOR PLUS IDENTIFYING INDICIA” AS 
A MARK 
The Smack Apparel plaintiffs did not seek protection for 
color schemes alone, but rather for color schemes combined 
with “other identifying indicia” of the universities.63 The idea of 
  
 60 Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 473 (“[The plaintiffs] alleged that Smack’s 
shirts infringed their unregistered trademarks by ‘combining Plaintiffs’ Marks with 
references to, inter alia, . . . (a) well-known and highly-publicized athletic events in 
which a University participated; (b) a University’s opponent in the referenced athletic 
event; (c) the geographic area in which the referenced event takes place; (d) titles and 
honors bestowed as a result of the referenced athletic event; (e) a University’s earlier 
athletic successes and accomplishments; and (f) the geographic area in which the 
University is located or associated.”). 
 61 Buxton, supra note 32 (Brian Hommel, the Director of Finance and 
Administrative Service at Louisiana State University said, “We don’t own purple and 
gold. We won’t make the Lakers or Minnesota Vikings stop using it.”). 
 62 Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art Inc., No. CV 05-UNAS-PT-585-W, 
677 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1249 (N.D. Ala. 2009). 
 63 Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 465. 
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a trademark consisting of color plus some other specified 
identifying indicia would hardly be novel under trademark law, 
and indeed such trademarks were held valid even before 
Qualitex.64 But the protection of color plus unspecified 
identifying indicia was the real novelty of Smack Apparel. And 
in granting that protection, the Fifth Circuit misread and thus 
inappropriately broadened the Lanham Act.  
Before a color mark—or any mark, for that matter—can 
be found to have the requisite “secondary meaning” for 
protection, it must be, in fact, a mark. An undefined “color plus 
other identifying indicia” formulation simply does not 
constitute a mark at all. The mistake occurs in the Fifth 
Circuit’s reading of section 1127—the definition section of the 
Lanham Act—which reads, in relevant part,  
[t]he term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or device, 
or any combination thereof (1) used by a person, or (2) which a 
person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to 
register on the principal register established by this chapter, to 
identify and distinguish his or her goods.65 
The decision seizes on the phrase “any combination thereof” and 
then reasons, “[b]ecause the court recognizes that trademarks 
may include color, we see no reason to exclude color plus other 
identifying indicia from the realm of protectable marks, provided 
the remaining requirements for protection are met.”66 What the 
Fifth Circuit misunderstands is that the phrase “any 
combination thereof” in section 1127 refers to specific, defined 
marks that use some combinations of words, names, symbols, 
etc.67 The definition of a trademark in section 1127 thus in no 
way implies that a valid mark may include an undefined and 
potentially limitless set of “identifying indicia.”  
In the trademark registration context, marks with some 
indefinite “changeable or ‘phantom’ element,”—sometimes 
  
 64 See, e.g., NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 
1990) (“This court’s interpretation of the Lanham Act adequately protects the use of 
color as an element of a trademark. Although color alone cannot be protected as a 
trademark, it may be protected if it is used in connection with some symbol or design or 
impressed in a particular design, as a circle, square, triangle, a cross, or a star.”). 
 65 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 66 Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 475-76. 
 67 The Fifth Circuit’s analysis, while an improper application of trademark 
law, is stronger than the trademark analysis in the district court opinion, which fails 
even to examine the question of the definition of the mark and instead jumps directly 
into examining “secondary meaning” analysis. Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. v. 
Smack Apparel Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 653, 656 (E.D. La. 2006). 
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referred to as “phantom marks,”68—are in fact strongly 
disfavored. Some of the policy reasons for this disfavor, 
admittedly, make sense primarily in the registration context—
for example, the policy rationale of avoiding the registration of 
trademarks that become unsearchable to would-be users.69 But, 
to a certain extent, the “notice” rationale can be extended to 
unregistered users, who cannot avoid violating a mark if they 
have no way of knowing what the mark is. And further, 
consumers cannot select a product by its mark if they don’t 
know what the mark is.  
In some senses, the “plus other identifying indicia” 
formulation is even more problematic than the typical 
“phantom mark” situation, because it is even more open-ended. 
For example, International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc. was 
denied registration of the mark “LIVING XXXX FLAVORS” for 
essential oils to be used in flavoring commercial products, 
where the “XXXX” was to be replaced with the names of various 
flavors (“STRAWBERRY,” “CILANTRO,” “GREEN BELL 
PEPPER,” etc.)70 on the rationale that the undefined portion of 
the mark made it an improper “phantom mark.” If anything, the 
“other identifying indicia” of Smack Apparel presents a far more 
vast and less defined universe of possibilities than the “XXXX” 
in the “LIVING XXXX FLAVORS” mark, since at least the 
“XXXX” must presumably be replaced with some flavor name.  
As a counterexample, it is worth taking note of J & J 
Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp.71 There, McDonald’s 
was afforded common-law protection of its “Mc” family of 
marks for food product names that combined “Mc” with generic 
food names (e.g., “McMuffin,” “McChicken,” and “McRib”). 
McDonald’s did not claim to own the “Mc” mark alone,72 just as 
the Smack Apparel plaintiffs lay no claim to their color 
schemes alone, but nonetheless, the court allowed McDonald’s to 
block J & J Snack Foods Corp. from registering the trademarks 
“McPretzel” and “McDugal,” because they would be confusingly 
similar to McDonald’s “Mc” family of marks.73 In that case, the 
court protected an unregistered trademark or “family” of marks 
  
 68 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 18, § 19:61.50. 
 69 In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 70 Id.  
 71 932 F.2d 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 72 Id. at 1463. In fact, the “Mc” standalone mark was registered by 
McCormick & Company for use on spice products. Id. 
 73 Id. 
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with an open-ended or missing element. But the open-ended 
element in the “Mc” family of marks presented a relatively 
narrow range of possibilities—for example, generic names of 
foods that might be offered in a fast-food restaurant—whereas 
“indicia” of a university seems to encompass almost anything 
that refers to a particular university, even by implication. 
Because the color-plus-other-identifying-indicia test 
cannot be defined in terms of boundaries, it is unclear at what 
point such combinations would no longer fall within the 
protected range of marks. In other words, it’s unclear just what 
encompasses the “marks” that these universities purport to 
own, and thus it is unclear what would constitute 
infringement. What if, for example, a shirt displayed LSU’s 
purple and gold color scheme and the slogan “Beat Oklahoma,” 
but made no reference to being “2003 College Football National 
Champions”? Or what if the shirt merely displayed the school 
colors in stripes and showed a large “#1”? One might see such a 
shirt in the context of an athletic apparel store in the vicinity of 
LSU and assume it was a reference to the champion football 
team, or one might see it elsewhere and assume no such thing. 
Thus Smack Apparel’s misreading of the Lanham Act opens the 
door to overly expansive protection for a wide range of things 
that do not really fit the legal definition of trademarks, but are, 
at best, ambiguous references to a university. 
In fact, as of January 3, 2010—over two years after the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision74—Smack Apparel’s website still 
featured a large line of shirts that use what appear to be 
university color schemes and thinly-veiled references to the 
universities. For example, if one clicks the link labeled “Baton 
Rouge, LA” (the hometown of Louisiana State University), one 
can purchase a shirt with gold and purple type reading “Baton 
Rouge, A Drinkin’ Town With a Football Problem,” as well as 
other purple-and-gold football-themed shirts. Shirts of a 
similar nature referencing the other three plaintiff universities 
are also still for sale, as well as similar shirts for dozens of 
other universities.75 Smack Apparel’s continued sale of such 
  
 74 “Smack shirts that continue to be marked are still under review and further 
action may well be taken in the future.” Siegal Interview, supra note 1. Siegal did not 
comment on his perception of the legality or illegality of any particular Smack shirts. Id. 
 75 See SMACK APPAREL, http://www.smackapparel.com (follow “College Smack” 
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 11, 2010) (listing dozens of major college towns for which 
apparel is available). 
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shirts may merely suggest defiance or willful blindness.76 It 
may also be that Smack Apparel privately agreed with 
universities to remove some of the offending shirts while being 
allowed to keep others, though the author knows of no such 
agreement. Further, if that is the case, it is not entirely clear 
why the aforementioned shirt would be acceptable to Louisiana 
State University while shirts targeted by the lawsuit would be 
unacceptable. Regardless, Smack Apparel did little to clarify 
what “trademarks” the universities actually own, or what 
would constitute infringement on those marks. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF “COLOR PLUS IDENTIFYING INDICIA” AS 
A “SOURCE IDENTIFIER”77 
As illustrated in Part II, “color plus other identifying 
indicia” as a trademark is, at best, conceptually murky. For 
this reason alone, Smack Apparel should be overturned, or at 
least other courts should not extend it. When the law becomes 
muddled, it becomes more difficult to comply with and more 
difficult for courts to uphold. But at the same time, universities 
deserve the ability to prevent manufacturers of goods from 
creating consumer confusion as to their supposed approval or 
endorsement of a particular product. Whatever the definition of 
a “mark” is, one of its purposes is clearly to prevent 
manufacturers from giving the false impression that their 
goods are approved of or sponsored by an entity that does not 
in fact approve of or sponsor them. So putting aside the 
conceptual murkiness for a moment, it is worth asking whether 
goods that use university color schemes plus other identifying 
indicia of the universities necessarily give that false impression.  
The crucial question, then, is whether the marks are, in 
fact, “source identifiers,” and this is where the analysis of the 
Fifth Circuit goes wrong. Both the plaintiffs and defendants 
seemed to agree that the color schemes, in combination with 
other identifying indicia of the universities, refer to the 
  
 76 Another successful trademark infringement action was recently brought 
against Smack Apparel in the Southern District of New York. Heisman Trophy Trust v. 
Smack Apparel Co., 637 F. Supp. 2d 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). There, Smack Apparel 
continued to sell products that infringed on the Heisman Trophy Trust’s trademarks 
after Smack Apparel had agreed to cease doing so in a settlement agreement. Id. 
 77 A recent article describes numerous recent cases—including one involving 
Smack Apparel—where courts have ignored or glossed over the source-identification 
purpose of trademark law. Smack Apparel is briefly discussed as an example. Mark A. 
Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 419 (2010). 
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universities.78 Smack Apparel’s own arguments make it clear 
that their products are deliberate attempts to capitalize on fan 
affinity for certain universities and colleges.79 But the court 
fails to adequately examine the Smack defendants’ arguments, 
instead creating a conclusory equivalency between referring to 
the universities and creating confusion as to source.80 
A. Source Identification in the Licensing Context 
In order to examine this issue further, it’s important to 
clarify exactly how a trademark operates in the context of 
licensed products, which is fairly different from the typical 
product trademark context. Normally, a trademark signifies that 
a particular product is of a certain brand or make. But when a 
trademark owner licenses a separate manufacturer to use the 
mark on goods—particularly goods that are “far-flung”81 from the 
original or primary purpose of the trademark, the mark serves 
to identify the “secondary source” rather than the manufacturer: 
Trademarks can also serve to identify and distinguish a “secondary 
source” in the sense of indicating sponsorship or authorization by a 
recognized entity. For example, the name or logo of a university on 
clothing can signify that the university authorizes, endorses and 
licenses the sale of such wearing apparel by the manufacturer. The 
same is true of sports teams’ emblems, television marks and 
characters, and commercial firm’s marks used on wearing apparel.82 
Thus when a university licenses out its logo for use on apparel or 
dish-towels or even footballs or academic planners, the primary 
purpose is not to assure consumers of a certain consistent level 
of quality due to uniform manufacture, but to signify approval or 
endorsement by the university. Universities are providers of 
education, and—increasingly—sports entertainment; they are 
not, however, manufacturers of apparel or office supplies or 
household goods, and it is doubtful that most consumers imagine 
them to be. 
  
 78 Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack 
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 477 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Smack admitted it had incorporated 
the Universities’ color schemes into its shirts to refer to the Universities and call them 
to the mind of the consumer.”). 
 79 Id. 
 80 See id. 
 81 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 18, § 24:9. 
 82 Id. § 3:4 (internal citations omitted).  
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The First Circuit, in Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan,83 
rightfully pointed out the conceptual difficulties that can arise 
in dealing with licensed trademarks on far-flung products. In 
that case, the defendant—who was ultimately found to be 
infringing on the plaintiff’s trademark—had produced 
unauthorized t-shirts emblazoned with the plaintiff’s “Boston 
Marathon” mark. As the court noted:  
[F]ew people, other than legal specialists, could venture an informed 
opinion on whether someone using the logo of the sponsor of a 
sporting event is required to have the permission of the event’s 
sponsor. Lacking such knowledge, the question of approval is pure 
guesswork. To ask a factfinder to determine whether the public 
would think that defendants’ shirts were “authorized” or “official” 
shirts is to ask it to resolve a confusing and, in many contexts, 
virtually meaningless question.84 
The Court further points out that the question raises a 
“problem of circularity,”85 and quotes the 1984 edition of 
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition: 
If consumers think that most uses of a trademark require 
authorization, then in fact they will require authorization because 
the owner can enjoin consumer confusion caused by unpermitted 
uses or charge for licenses. And if owners can sue to stop 
unauthorized uses, then only authorized uses will be seen by 
consumers, creating or reinforcing the perception that authorization 
is necessary. This is a “chicken and the egg” conundrum.86 
The court ultimately went on to make a reasonable finding that 
confusion was likely, but based on a somewhat troubling 
premise: “Given the undisputed facts that (1) defendants 
intentionally referred to the Boston Marathon on its shirts, and 
(2) purchasers were likely to buy the shirts precisely because of 
that reference, we think it fair to presume that purchasers are 
likely to be confused about the shirt’s source or sponsorship.”87 
Thus the First Circuit’s unfortunate solution to the “circularity 
problem” was to leap to an unwarranted conclusion—the 
Boston Marathon trademark must be perceived as a source 
indicator because it’s the reason consumers buy the shirt.  
  
 83 Bos. Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1989). 
 84 Id. at 33. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. (quoting 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 24:3, at 170 (2d ed. 1984)). A nearly identical passage now appears at 4 MCCARTHY, 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:9 (4th ed. 2011). 
 87 Bos. Athletic, 867 F.2d at 34. 
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Of course, it’s arguable that when consumers see certain 
kinds of “official” word marks or logos, they do have a perception 
of a single source. The proliferation of licensing, which has been 
explosive even in the two decades since Boston Athletic v. 
Sullivan, may have created a consumer expectation that a 
university or other athletic team logo functions as a kind of 
official seal of approval—that a shirt bearing the LSU logo must 
require licensing by LSU.88 Mark Lemley, now a Stanford Law 
School professor, has argued that such an established consumer 
expectation might be justification enough to preserve trademark 
protection for licensed sports marks, since this expectation alone 
could lead to consumer confusion.89 But, Lemley cautions, “a 
limited, likelihood-of-confusion rationale for keeping a bad law 
intact is quite different from a theoretical justification for 
cementing and extending the merchandising right.”90 
By extension of Lemley’s reasoning, the color-scheme-
plus-indicia formula of Smack Apparel does not warrant the 
same protection as a university logo. The Smack Apparel court 
presents little if any evidence that the public has come, by 
operation of the law and the proliferation of licensing, to 
understand a color-scheme-plus-indicia as an official symbol of 
the university’s approval.91 In fact, only recently have any 
courts even suggested that color plus identifying indicia could 
serve as a mark, so it’s unlikely that the consuming public has 
fully absorbed the idea that a shirt displaying only color 
schemes and indicia, without the presence of any other specific 
marks, requires approval.  
The Fifth Circuit in Smack Apparel rests its finding of 
secondary meaning (and thus source-identification) in the color 
schemes in part on its 1975 decision in Boston Professional 
Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc.92 In that case, 
  
 88 See Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common 
Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1708 (1999) (“Ironically, having accepted the merchandising 
rationale for certain sorts of trademarks, we may find it hard to undo. It is possible 
that consumers have come to expect that ‘Dallas Cowboys’ caps are licensed by the 
Cowboys, not because they serve a trademark function, but simply because the law has 
recently required such a relationship.”). 
 89 Id. at 1706-07. 
 90 Id. at 1708. “Merchandising right” as Lemley uses it here refers to an 
athletic team’s exclusive right to profit from merchandise referencing the team, a right 
that Lemley considers a questionable goal of trademark law. Id. at 1707-09. 
 91 The court was presented with, but ultimately did not rely on, slight anecdotal 
evidence that an apparel shop owner who carried Smack’s apparel was occasionally asked 
by consumers: “Are these licensed?” Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. 
Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 483 n.69 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 92 Id. at 484.  
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the court held that a manufacturer of unlicensed cloth patches 
bearing professional sports team logos infringed on the plaintiffs’ 
trademarks.93 While the result may have been sound, the decision 
faced much criticism94 for dicta that appeared to do away with the 
confusion requirement for trademark infringement: “The 
confusion or deceit requirement is met by the fact that the 
defendant duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them to 
the public knowing that the public would identify them as being 
the teams’ trademarks.”95 
Critics argued that the decision really posited a “new 
‘merchandising right’ to control all uses of a trademark of a 
sports team,” which “seemed to be an independent right to 
exclude, unmoored to the traditional rule that likelihood of 
confusion of source, sponsorship or approval marked the outer 
boundaries of trademark infringement.”96 Yet even though the 
Fifth Circuit has since insisted that it was not divorcing 
likelihood of confusion from trademark law,97 it ironically made 
the same mistake again in Smack Apparel, relying on the same 
flawed Boston Hockey reasoning:  
We have previously noted, although not in the context of secondary 
meaning, that team emblems and symbols are sold because they 
serve to identify particular teams, organizations, or entities with 
which people wish to identify. See Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. 
Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc. We think this desire by consumers 
to associate with a particular university supports the conclusion that 
team colors and logos are, in the minds of the fans and other 
consumers, source indicators of team-related apparel. By associating 
the color and other indicia with the university, the fans perceive the 
university as the source or sponsor of the goods because they want to 
associate with that source.98 
This can be contrasted with the better-reasoned holding in 
National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls 
Sportswear, Inc.99 which grounded itself in the traditional 
  
 93 Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 
1004 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 94 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 18, § 24:10; Int’l Order of Job’s 
Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980); Dogan & Lemley, 
supra note 17, at 464, 473-74. 
 95 Bos. Prof’l Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1012. 
 96 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 18, § 24:10. 
 97 See Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 485 (arguing that its holding in KFC v. 
Diversified Packaging Co., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977), clarified that the Boston 
Professional Hockey decision did not do away with the confusion requirement). 
 98 Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 477-78 (emphasis added). 
 99 532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982). 
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source-confusion rationale of trademark law. NFL team names 
and logos on jerseys were treated as source-indicators only 
because of strong survey evidence suggesting that the public 
had come to see them as symbols of approval or sponsorship.100 
Drawing the same conclusion about team color schemes with 
virtually no evidence is simply unwarranted.  
Further, it’s arguable that color plus identifying indicia 
simply might not be as well suited as a logo or word mark to 
gain traction in the public consciousness as a source-indicator. A 
logo is a distinct, recognizable symbol that can be reproduced in 
approximately the same manner on numerous products. In this 
way, it is well suited to function as a seal of approval. Color plus 
identifying indicia, by contrast, is a shapeless, indeterminate 
description of an almost infinite set of possible configurations. 
In a particularly questionable move, the Fifth Circuit 
finds evidence of source identification in a pronoun found on 
Smack Apparel’s shirts: “The use of the inclusive first-person 
personal pronoun “we” [in t-shirt slogans such as “Got Seven? 
We do!”] easily permits the inference that the schools are the 
speakers in the shirts and therefore endorsed the message.”101 A 
simpler reading seems more plausible: fans of a sports team 
tend to identify with a team, especially those in a university 
setting. Fans at college football games commonly hold up signs 
with messages like “We’re #1.” To suggest that this sign implies 
that “the schools are the speakers . . . and therefore endorsed 
the message” would be absurd.  
Businesses in college towns might also display signs 
reading “We’re #1” or “Celebrate our victory with two-dollar 
pints”—for example, a local tavern seeking to attract fans as 
patrons. According to the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, combining 
that message with a university color scheme might confuse 
consumers into thinking that the university had endorsed the 
tavern and its two-dollar pint promotion. 
In short, the Smack Apparel reasoning is just creation of 
merchandising rights though the back door—dressing up what 
is really a non-confusion-based theory of ownership of a color 
scheme in the language of classic source-confusion-based 
trademark law. 
  
 100 Id. at 658-59. 
 101 Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 489. 
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B. The Red Herring of “Functionality” 
The Smack Apparel court, in finding the color schemes 
plus indicia to be source identifiers, reached the conclusion that 
color schemes did not play a “functional” role in the Smack 
products. The doctrine of functionality in trademark law 
effectively prevents would-be trademark holders from protecting 
elements of a product that also help the product serve its 
essential function in some way or to compete effectively in the 
marketplace.102 The functionality doctrine is designed to prevent 
trademark holders from monopolizing or “locking up” design 
features that are necessary to market entry and competition.  
But the analysis of functionality here turns, somewhat 
paradoxically, on whether the mark is really a “source 
identifier.” If the purpose of the color scheme “mark” is to 
identify the source of the goods, then Smack Apparel’s 
functionality argument evaporates—it would be nonsensical on 
its face to assert that the use of a source-identifying mark to 
falsely identify an infringing product’s source is “functional”; to 
claim as much would be to assert that infringement itself is 
functional. If one rejects the premise that the color scheme is a 
“source identifier,” however, then plaintiffs’ argument becomes 
moot. In other words, if the color schemes are not truly “source 
identifiers,” then they can have a valid functional purpose as 
asserted by Smack Apparel—to refer to and show affinity for 
the universities they signify.  
IV. A MONOPOLY ON COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OF FAN 
AFFINITY 
The preceding sections of this note have focused 
primarily on formalistic analysis of the Lanham Act and its 
case law progeny, and on examinations of the underlying 
purposes of trademark law and the policies behind it. This 
section, however, is about the fans.  
College sports—especially college football—seem to 
command a special kind of fan devotion. As Warren St. John 
explains in “Rammer Jammer Yellow Hammer”—a memoir about 
a community of people who follow, by RV, the University of 
Alabama Crimson Tide football team to all of its away games— 
  
 102 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 18, § 7:63-66. 
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[T]he sport [in Alabama] that inspires true fervor—the one that 
compels people there to name their children after a popular coach 
and to heave bricks through the windows of an unpopular one—is 
college football. A recent poll [the book was published in 2004] by the 
Mobile Register found that 90 percent of the state’s citizens describe 
themselves as college football fans . . . . To understand what an 
absolute minority nonfans are in Alabama, consider this: They are 
outnumbered by atheists.103 
Further, college sports tend to inspire a level of ecstatic 
fan devotion that goes even beyond that of professional sports. 
Many of the fans of college sports are themselves alumni and 
thus feel a deep personal connection to their alma maters and 
their teams. Other fans, like Warren St. John, may have grown 
up in the area of the university. And the areas of some of the 
biggest powerhouse sports schools (Alabama, for example) often 
lack a professional sports franchise in the immediate vicinity, 
leaving the college teams as the sole local teams to root for.  
As one British journalist, seeking to explain “the 
mystery of US college sports’ popularity” to a confused British 
newspaper readership, observed: 
[Americans] have professional teams and leagues, and supporters 
are enthusiastic, but the spread of professional sport in the US is 
geographically narrow, confined in the main to the biggest urban 
centres. Vast swaths of the country—particularly the southern 
states—have no rooting interest. It is here that college sport really is 
elevated to the status of religion. It is a cultural thing.104 
In other words, big-time college sports seem to foster a kind of 
community that both fans and commercial enterprises 
understandably wish to take part in. And members of the 
community also contribute in large ways to the “good will” of 
the university. Universities, and in particular their sports 
teams, are somewhat of a special case in this regard. 
Universities are not merely licensers of consumable products, 
but fosterers of academic, athletic and social cohesiveness. 
University sports have a participatory component—students 
compete, and those who attend games and root for college teams 
feel like they are taking part in the event. Even college-town 
businesses that in some sense free ride off of universities are at 
  
 103 ST. JOHN, supra note 37, at 1. 
 104 Lawrence Donegan, Education Buried Under Money-Spinning Mountain of 
US College Sport, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/blog/2009/ 
jan/08/american-college-sports. 
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the same time contributing to the atmosphere of excitement and 
camaraderie around universities and their teams. 
The Fifth Circuit correctly recognized that defendant 
Smack Apparel was deliberately capitalizing on the success of 
the football teams of OU, LSU and other universities in its 
manufacture of unlicensed apparel.105 Indeed it would be 
difficult to view Smack’s shirts any other way, as the shirts 
contain unmistakable references to the respective schools’ 
football teams, and thus can be understood as products aiming 
to capture a segment of the market for fan merchandise for 
those teams. But trademark law does not necessarily protect 
against every attempt to capitalize on the success of another, 
nor should it. For example, a sports bar that merely chooses to 
locate itself near a college stadium is in some sense capitalizing 
on, or free riding on the success of the school’s football team, 
but trademark law has no quarrel with such free riding. As the 
First Circuit observed in WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass’n,106 
[T]he law sometimes protects investors from the “free riding” of 
others; and sometimes it does not. The law, for example, gives 
inventors a “property right” in certain inventions for a limited period 
of time; it provides copyright protection for authors; it offers certain 
protections to trade secrets. But, the man who clears a swamp, the 
developer of a neighborhood, the academic scientist, the school 
teacher, and millions of others, each day create “value” (over and 
above what they are paid) that the law permits others to receive 
without charge. Just how, when and where the law should protect 
investments in “intangible” benefits or goods is a matter that 
legislators typically debate, embodying the results in specific 
statutes, or that common law courts, carefully weighing relevant 
competing interests, gradually work out over time. The trademark 
statute does not give the appellants any “property right” in their 
mark except “the right to prevent confusion.”107 
Smack Apparel, in effect, does far more than protect 
universities and consumers from potential source confusion, 
but rather gives universities an effective monopoly on the 
display of affinity for the schools and their athletic programs. It 
does not, of course, directly prevent a fan from painting his 
body school colors or making a banner using school colors, 
because trademark law concerns only uses in commerce.108 But 
  
 105 Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 482. 
 106 926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991). The case concerned another alleged infringing 
use of “Boston Marathon”—this time by a television station. Id. at 44. 
 107 Id. at 45 (internal citations omitted). 
 108 15 USC § 1125 (2006). The “use in commerce” requirement stems from the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, because trademark law, unlike copyright and 
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it does seem to discourage or prevent the creation of any 
“unlicensed” product designed to in some way appeal to fan 
affinity, even if it’s unlikely anyone would assume that the 
product was sponsored by the trademark holding university.  
For example, fans who paint their bodies in school colors 
before attending football games are not, of course, looking to 
give the impression that they have some kind of license, 
permission or approval of the university, but merely to express 
support for the university and its team. As it happens, 
universities have already licensed “official” body paint 
manufacturers,109 but in theory, there is no reason why another 
body paint manufacturer shouldn’t be allowed to compete with 
these licensed manufacturers for the student market. Such 
competition would benefit consumers by driving quality 
increases and price cuts. Yet under Smack Apparel, it’s at least 
arguable that the moment a seller did anything to target an 
unlicensed brand of paint to fans at a particular university, the 
seller would be infringing on the university’s trademark by 
using its colors plus other identifying indicia, especially since 
“indicia” seems to encompass almost anything that makes clear 
reference to the university. 
Such capitalization might be characterized as free 
riding on the goodwill of the university, but then so could a lot 
of other non-infringing business uses of references to a 
university. The Smack defendants themselves included in their 
exhibits photos of a number of local businesses that made 
unlicensed use of university indicia and colors.110 In fact it 
seems to be common practice in college towns for local 
businesses to in some way reference the university and/or its 
teams. A search for “tiger” in the Princeton, NJ Yellow Pages,111 
for example, reveals business with names like “Tiger Garage,” 
“Tiger Noodles,” and “Tiger Inn,”—all of which free ride in 
some way off the goodwill of the Princeton University Tigers. 
Tuscaloosa, Alabama has a Crimson Café, a Crimson 
Chiropractic Center, a Crimson Castle Chess & Games, and 
many other “Crimson” businesses. The Crimson Inn Bed and 
  
patent law, does not derive from an independent clause in the Constitution. See 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 18, § 5:3. 
 109 BSI Products, for example, makes official collegiate licensed “Face & Body Paint” 
kits in school colors. See PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE BASED SHOPPING, http://football.pubks.com/Lsu-
Tigers-Face-Body-Paint-Kit (last visited Feb. 26, 2011). 
 110 Smack Apparel, 550 F.3d at 479. 
 111 See YELLOW PAGES, http://www.yellowpages.com (last visited March 15, 
2011). (enter “Tiger” in the first search box and “Princeton, NJ” in the second search box).  
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Breakfast even features “Mikal’s ‘Bama Room,” which is 
“decorated especially with the Alabama fan in mind.”112 All are 
presumably attempting to attract business by appealing to fan 
sentiment about the Alabama Crimson Tide. Yet it’s hard to 
imagine that any of these businesses create a likelihood of 
confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation merely by referring to 
the University of Alabama. 
V. UNIVERSITY TRADEMARK ENFORCEMENT AFTER SMACK 
APPAREL 
The full ramifications of Smack Apparel for trademark law 
are not yet clear, but the potential certainly exists for overzealous 
color-based trademark enforcement by universities. This part will 
explain why Smack Apparel contributes to this problem, and will 
explore three recent cases in which universities overreached in 
attempting to enforce rights in their colors. 
A. The “Trademark Extortion”113 Problem 
Court decisions make up only a small part of the overall 
trademark enforcement picture. Most disputes are resolved 
before they start, either through cease-and-desist letters that 
convince alleged infringers to stop their conduct, or through 
litigation that forces early settlement before a judge or jury can 
make any findings of fact or law.114 Professor Kenneth Port of 
William Mitchell College of Law has suggested that trademark 
holders increasingly use both cease-and-desist letters and 
lawsuits,115 not just to pursue objectionable behavior, but to 
expand their own trademark rights and deter market entrants.116 
The potential harm of Smack Apparel manifests itself not 
only in court, but in these letters and “strike suits.”117 The Fifth 
Circuit’s vague color-plus-identifying-indicia framework gives 
  
 112 See INFOHUB, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:KD5I_ 
lIt-lcJ:www.infohub.com/Lodgings/lodging_pages/1520.html+%22mikal%27s+bama+ 
room%22&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source=www.google.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).  
 113 See Kenneth Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585 (2008). 
 114 See id. at 588-90. 
 115 Port points to United States District Court data showing a steep increase 
since the 1970s in the overall number of trademark suits filed, combined with a decline 
in the percentage of trademark lawsuits that are resolved on the merits to a mere 1.3 
percent in 2006. Id. at 589.  
 116 Id. at 589-90. 
 117 See id. 
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universities new opportunities to claim trademark infringement, 
to pursue dubious enforcement actions, and to force alleged 
infringers to acquiesce to cease-and-desist demands, regardless 
of the viability of the underlying infringement claim. 
B. The Bud Light “Fan Can” Controversy 
Though cease-and-desist letters are not generally made 
public, at least one successful post-Smack Apparel trademark 
enforcement attempt by universities has garnered national 
media attention. Late in 2009, at least twenty-five universities 
sent cease-and-desist letters to Anheuser-Busch regarding its 
Bud Light “Fan Can” marketing scheme.118 The “Fan Cans” 
feature color schemes resembling those of certain universities 
and are sold in the area of the respective universities,119 but 
feature no marks or indicia of the universities other than the 
colors. Universities have nonetheless complained that the cans 
violate their trademarks120 and that the cans improperly 
associate the schools with underage drinking.121 Anheuser-
Busch pulled the cans in a number of markets where they 
received complaints,122 even though it maintained that it had 
the legal right to use the color schemes.123 
The complaining universities appear to have been 
emboldened by the Smack Apparel holding. Bruce Siegal, 
counsel for the Collegiate Licensing Company, felt that the “fan 
cans” constituted infringement under Smack Apparel: 
Our view was that the manner in which the Team Pride beer can 
program would be marketed would make it clear that the intent was 
to market product to students and fans of the respective universities, 
and that the use of colors and marketing and promotional activities 
would create confusion in the marketplace that the product was 
sponsored or authorized by the respective schools.124 
  
 118 Jon Fogg, First Down: Budweiser’s Shady Ad Campaign, WASH. TIMES 
(Sept. 5, 2009), http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/sep/05/first-down-budweisers-
shady-ad-campaign. 
 119 Id. 
 120 OU, OSU Say This Bud’s Not for You, OKLAHOMAN (Aug. 26, 2009), 
http://www.newsok.com/article/3395703. 
 121 Id. An Iowa newspaper article suggested a slight irony to the University of 
Iowa’s complaint to this effect, in that the University of Iowa itself licenses its trademarks 
for pint glasses, pitchers, shot glasses, beer can coolers and bottle openers. U of I, ISU 
Objection to ‘Fan Cans’ Is Questioned, DES MOINES REGISTER, Sept. 12, 2009, at 1. 
 122 See, e.g., Fan Cans Canned, KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 18, 2009. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Siegal Interview, supra note 1. 
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Like the Fifth Circuit, Siegal appears to conflate “intent to 
market” with the creation of a likelihood of confusion. 
Moreover, Siegal’s comment demonstrates the slippery slope of 
the Smack holding. If “other identifying indicia” is to be left 
undefined, then why can’t it include the mere market context of 
a sale, or indeed, even apparent intent to associate with a 
particular university? When mere color plus intent to sell to 
fans becomes a “trademark,” it becomes obvious that the 
purpose is no longer to prevent confusion, but to lock up the 
right to profit from fan enthusiasm. 
Of course, whether the Fan Cans actually would be 
infringement under Smack Apparel is questionable at best, 
since the cans use only the colors and no “other identifying 
indicia.” In fact, some school officials stated either that they did 
not own the color schemes alone,125 or that the colors used on 
the fan cans weren’t confusingly similar enough to the school’s 
colors to warrant action.126 But if treating them as infringing 
uses doesn’t fall within the letter of the Smack Apparel 
holding, it seems consistent with its spirit. 
It hardly seems likely that the complaining universities 
hoped to get a piece of Bud Light’s sales revenue on the cans 
through licensing,127 since pursuing such a course wouldn’t 
comport with discouraging underage drinking. But the 
complaining universities do appear to have hoped to use 
  
 125 Buxton, supra note 32 (quoting Brian Hommel, Director of Finance and 
Administrative Services, Louisiana State University); see also Mara Rose Williams, 
Can the Team-Colored Bud Light Cans, MU, KU Officials Demand, KAN. CITY STAR, 
Sept. 2, 2009 (“If the cans had a university logo and had a Powercat on them, then 
obviously we would be concerned. . . . We have a commitment to educating our students 
about underage drinking, but we don’t have a trade mark on purple and white.”). 
 126 “‘The cans are definitely orange, but we would call it a (University of) 
Tennessee orange, or a Syracuse orange,’ said Christine Plonsky, [University of Texas 
at Austin] Director of Women’s Athletics, who oversees licensing and trademarks for 
the school. ‘We looked at it and said . . . it’s not our colors.’” Jeannie Kever, Bud’s Fan 
Can Promo Losing Its Fizz, HOUS. CHRONICLE (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www.chron.com/ 
disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/6590413.html. Plonsky’s comment raises a specter of the 
very “shade confusion” that the Seventh Circuit once expressed concern about. 
NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 127 One newspaper pointed out that the Bud Light “fan cans” commanded a 
local price premium over regular Bud Light. Jeff Wilkinson, ‘Fan Can’ Beer Sales Are 
Falling Flat, COLUMBIA STATE, Aug. 28, 2009, at A (“The cases sell for $15.99, which is 
$3 more than a sale price on regular Bud Light cases offered at other stores.”). This is 
at least anecdotal evidence that, for better or for worse, the color scheme of the 
university alone has some economic value when affixed to a product. On the other 
hand, the same newspaper article quoted managers of two Columbia, S.C. liquor stores 
as saying that the fan cans were failing to sell well. One observed that consumers 
seemed to prefer “what’s on sale,” so there may in fact be little added value from the 
color schemes. Id.  
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trademark law to bolster their brand protection efforts by 
preventing association of their schools with unwholesome 
products. And it appears their effort was a success. 
C. University of Alabama v. New Life Art 
A more hopeful post-Smack outcome occurred in 
University of Alabama Board of Trustees v. New Life Art, Inc.,128 
where a Northern District of Alabama judge refused to find 
that a painter of University of Alabama football scenes had 
infringed on the University of Alabama’s trademarks by using 
the team’s crimson and crème color scheme in his paintings. 
The defendant artist, Daniel Moore, made a business of 
painting various lifelike sports scenes.129 Moore had painted 
numerous University of Alabama football scenes, and in fact 
had previously had a licensing agreement with the University 
of Alabama, but the paintings at issue did not feature the 
registered trademarks of the University of Alabama.130 
The case turned in part on the artistic nature of the 
defendant’s paintings, which entitled them to special protection 
under the First Amendment.131 In a finding that raises 
questions worthy of their own discussion, the court drew a 
distinction between the defendant’s paintings and the 
merchandise he produced (such as t-shirts and mugs) with 
images of the same paintings printed on them.132 The paintings 
were protected outright against infringement claims by the 
First Amendment; the merchandise was not and thus 
warranted scrutiny under Trademark law. Nonetheless, the 
court at least questioned the argument that Alabama’s color 
scheme functioned as a trademark in the paintings, or that it 
would confuse consumers into thinking that the paintings were 
sponsored or authorized by the University of Alabama.133 The 
  
 128 Memorandum Opinion, CV 05-UNAS-PT-585-W (N.D. Ala. Nov. 2, 2009) 
[hereinafter New Life Art Memorandum Opinion] (unavailable on Westlaw); Addendum 
to Memorandum Opinion, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1239 (N.D. Ala. 2009) [hereinafter 
New Life Art Addendum]. 
 129  New Life Art Addendum, supra note 128, at *2. 
 130  Id. at 1243. 
 131 Id. at 1258. 
 132 Id. at 1241; New Life Art Memorandum Opinion, supra note 128.  
 133 New Life Art Memorandum Opinion, supra note 128, at 13 (“If the 
statement in Leigh v. Warner Brothers, Inc., that ‘Trademarks are not merely 
descriptive; they answer the question “who made it?” rather than “what is it?”’ is 
applicable, the answer to ‘who made it’ is clearly ‘Moore.’”). 
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judge certified the case for immediate appeal,134 recognizing “a 
plethora of issues for courts to disentangle,” and ultimately 
that its treatment of the trademark issue is cursory and 
incomplete. But hopefully the Eleventh Circuit will decline to 
extend the Fifth Circuit’s distortion of trademark law. 
The New Life Art case is a perfect illustration of the 
distinction between a product that refers to a university with 
an intent to target its fan base, versus a product that actually 
confuses fans as to a source. The facts make clear that the 
defendant intended to target his paintings to University of 
Alabama fans. Even the artistic nature of the works does not 
change the fact that they were also commercial products 
seeking to tap into a particular market. But none of this should 
matter under trademark law, so long as there was no 
significant risk of consumer confusion. Further, it would seem 
questionable at best to allow a university to determine who 
could and couldn’t sell paintings evocative of its football team, 
or to allow a university to collect a fee every time one of those 
paintings was sold.  
D. Madison County Winery, L.L.C. v. State of Iowa135 
In 2010, at least one business owner successfully turned 
the tables on universities overzealously asserting trademark 
rights in their color schemes. The University of Iowa and Iowa 
State demanded that Madison County Winery, of St. Charles, 
Iowa, cease producing wines called “Iowa Gold,” and “State 
Red,” which, respectively, used color schemes similar to those 
of University of Iowa and Iowa State.136 Rather than 
capitulating to the demands, the winery brought an action 
seeking a declaratory judgment that their wines violated no 
university trademarks.137 The universities settled the lawsuit in 
June, 2010,138—a quick move toward settlement that may 
suggest that the universities realized they had been 
overzealous in their trademark enforcement.  
  
 134 The docket report for the New Life district court case suggests that 
procedural delays since pushed the appeal back further. As of January 3, 2011, no 
appellate decision has been handed down. 
 135 Complaint, 4:10-cv-133 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 26, 2010). 
 136 Id. at 6-9. 
 137 Id. 
 138 B.A. Morelli, Weiger’s Accuser Received $130,000, IOWA CITY PRESS-
CITIZEN, Sept. 9, 2010, at B1. 
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The lawsuit points out that the “red” and “gold” refer to 
the colors of the respective wines. But even assuming the colors 
are in fact chosen to help market the wines to University of Iowa 
and Iowa State fans, this alone does not justify using trademark 
law to block them absent a likelihood of consumer confusion.  
CONCLUSION 
This note proposes two possible alternatives to Smack 
Apparel. The first is to create an alternate “unfair competition” 
legal theory under the Lanham Act or under state law, 
combined with a more fact-specific approach to infringement. 
The second is to simply keep—as much as possible—the pre-
Smack Apparel status quo, avoiding the creation of a murky 
trademark regime where the extent of rights in color marks 
will never be clear.  
A. Tackling Egregious Offenders with an Expansion of 
Unfair Competition Law 
Section 43(a) of The Lanham Act provides a cause of 
action for “unfair competition” in general.139 However, this 
provision has long been used almost exclusively for the 
enforcement of unregistered trademarks.140 Parties like the 
Smack Apparel plaintiffs use Section 43(a) to enforce 
trademarks that they have not yet registered (or have been 
unable to register), but in which they have still developed 
common-law rights. In theory, however, unfair competition is a 
broader doctrine based in tort and equitable concerns.141 A new 
application of Section 43(a) might thus be created to use against 
producers that compete in an especially unfair way with licensed 
products but manage to skirt existing trademark law. 
A reasonable argument could be made that Smack 
Apparel’s conduct in particular amounts to unfair 
competition—that Smack Apparel’s free riding on the good will 
of universities and colleges (and professional sports teams) is 
so wanton and widespread that it should be enjoined. If courts 
find something commercially indecent about producing 
unlicensed t-shirts that both refer to universities and target 
their fans without sharing profits with universities, a non-
  
 139 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
 140 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 12, at 14 
 141 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 18, §§ 1:8, 1:9 
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trademark-based unfair competition theory could be employed. 
An unfair competition theory might thus allow wronged parties 
to deal with particularly egregious offenders on a case-by-case 
basis without giving blanket rights to zealously enforce a 
nebulous trademark.  
To make such free riding by itself (without likelihood of 
confusion) actionable in this way could make it very difficult to 
determine what level of conduct is legally unfair competition. 
However, at least this would avoid creating larger problems 
with trademark law. Universities could go after offenders that 
profit heavily from their goodwill and take profits the 
university arguably deserves, without sweeping every product 
that references the university into the net. Without the weapon 
of the Smack Apparel holding that the color schemes are 
enforceable trademarks, universities would also have less of a 
mandate to go after products like the Bud Light fan can and 
the Madison County Winery wines via intimidating cease-and-
desist letters. In other words, universities would not have a 
precedent to cite giving the impression that they had total 
rights in their color schemes. Instead Universities would be 
forced to, in a sense, “put their money where their mouth is,” 
by litigating cases they truly believed to be unfair competition. 
This would enable universities to tackle the worst offenders 
while checking their tendency to lock up all products remotely 
related to the university—a trend that blogger and trademark 
attorney Ron Coleman characterizes as “the rent-grabbing 
aspects of this business model.”142  
Currently, the unfair competition law approach seems 
unlikely since unfair competition law, especially under section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act, is virtually exclusively used for 
unregistered trademarks.143 The doctrine has, however, seen 
some recent revival in so-called “hot news” cases of unfair 
competition between media sources,144 and perhaps it could see 
revival in other contexts as well. 
B.  Maintaining the Pre-Smack Apparel Status Quo 
A second approach, and perhaps preferable approach, 
would be for courts to simply draw a solid line at definable 
  
 142 See Ron Coleman, Turning Back That Crimson Tide, LIKELIHOOD OF 
CONFUSION (Nov. 3, 2009), http://www.likelihoodofconfusion.com/?p=3639. 
 143 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 12, at 14. 
 144 See, e.g., MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 18, § 10:62.10 . 
2011] SMACK APPAREL 1667 
trademarks and refuse to enforce beyond that line. It is simply 
not a proper goal of trademark law to enforce a university’s 
ability to profit from every single commercial appeal to its 
sports fans. Free riding, by itself, shouldn’t be a cause of action. 
As Mark Lemley put it,  
[T]he [Dallas] Cowboys might make less money than they would if 
trademarks were absolute property rights, and they might argue 
that this “discourages investment.” But so what? The point of 
trademark law has never been to maximize profits for trademark 
owners at the expense of competitors and consumers.145 
In a sense, the fans, too, have invested in building up the good 
will of these schools and deserve to benefit from competition in 
the market for fan-targeted goods and services. 
Ultimately, if trademark law is to grow beyond its 
original source-confusion-prevention purpose and take on the 
dimension of recognizing a merchandising right for universities, 
then the legislature, rather than the courts, should spearhead 
the expansion. And even if such a “merchandising right” were to 
be legislatively created, it’s not clear that it should include all 
permutations of color plus identifying indicia, since this would 
still leave the boundaries of the right unclear. Congress can 
amend the Lanham Act if it wishes, but as long as it doesn’t, the 
other circuit courts should steer clear of the Fifth Circuit’s 
murky reasoning in Smack Apparel.  
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